





Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge sometimes claim to study scientists belong-
ing to other forms of life. This claim causes difªculties, as traditionally
Wittgensteinians have taken it to be the case that other forms of life are in-
comprehensible to us. This paper examines whether, and how, sociologists
might gain understanding of another form of life, and whether, and how,
this understanding might be passed on to readers. I argue that most tech-
niques proposed for gaining and passing on understanding are inadequate,
but I end by describing a method that might work.
The problem
Many workers in Science Studies have been heavily inºuenced by Witt-
genstein’s later philosophy. Those inºuenced by Wittgenstein fall roughly
into two groups: “Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge,” whose work will
be discussed in greater detail in what follows, and “ethnomethodologists,”
of whom the best known is probably Michael Lynch.1 This paper is exclu-
sively concerned with a set of problems faced by the Wittgensteinian Soci-
ologists of Scientiªc Knowledge. On occasion, these investigators claim to
study scientists belonging to other forms of life. For brevity, throughout
this paper, I shall refer to people belonging to other forms of life as
“aliens”—though it should be borne in mind that I am chieºy concerned
A version of this paper was presented at a seminar in the Department of History and Phi-
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(1993).
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with aliens of the human variety, as opposed to little green men. Claiming
to understand aliens causes difªculties. Traditionally, Wittgensteinians
have taken it to be the case that alien forms of life are incomprehensible to
us (for example, Glock [1996], Kripke [1981]). If this is so, aiming to
produce a case study that explains to readers how members of an alien
form of life think is doubly problematic. First, on the traditional
Wittgensteinian view, sociologists should not themselves be able to un-
derstand the aliens. Second, even if by some miracle they do gain under-
standing, they shouldn’t be able to explain what they have learnt to the
rest of us.
Some of those who claim to provide case studies examining alternative
forms of life are alert to such worries. They accept there are problems with
understanding aliens, but hold that these problems can be overcome via
the use of “special methods.” This paper assesses these special methods.
First, I ask whether there are special methods that might enable sociolo-
gists to gain understanding of aliens themselves. Second, I ask whether
there are special methods that might enable them to pass on this under-
standing to others. I conclude with both bad news and good news for
those who would study others forms of life. On the one hand, most pro-
posed methods for understanding aliens cannot work. Whatever SSK case
studies using these methods do, they don’t enable us to understand differ-
ent forms of life. On the other hand, I end by developing an account of
a method that I claim might be effective. Projects that require gaining
and passing on an understanding of alien forms of life are difªcult but not
entirely hopeless, I claim.
Debates as to how Wittgenstein’s philosophy should be interpreted are
ªerce and interminable.2 Thus, to avoid getting bogged down in questions
of exegesis I will merely present the “Wittgensteinian” account prevalent
amongst proponents of SSK and leave to one side the question of the ex-
tent to which this account actually corresponds to anything held by
Wittgenstein. In this paper I am not claiming that “forms of life” should
be understood in the “SSK-way.” I merely seek to explore the problems
with understanding aliens that arise for anyone who does adhere to this
conception of “forms of life.” As such, if the SSK Wittgensteinian account
of forms of life turns out to misinterpret Wittgenstein, or is otherwise
mistaken, this is primarily a problem for the SSK Wittgensteinians, not
for me.
I will take it that the SSK Wittgensteinian account claims the follow-
ing:
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2. For debate on the correct interpretation of “form of life” see, for example, Finch
(1977), Garver (1994), Glock (1996), Hunter (1968).
1. Members of different forms of life see different similarity rela-
tions. They “go on in the same way” differently.
2. We cannot understand beings belonging to a different form of
life (at least not without using special techniques).
These claims are made most explicitly in the writings of Harry Collins. In
Changing Order, for example, he states that we should “expect groups to be
able to communicate readily within themselves because of their members’
common ways of going on, but equally we would expect difªculty in com-
munication between culturally diverse groups . . . the members of differ-
ent cultures live within different forms of life” (Collins 1985, p. 15). Mar-
tin Kusch and Trevor Pinch, both of whom have written books with
Collins, appear to share his views. In The Shape of Actions, Collins and
Kusch state that forms of life differ in what is generally accepted as proper
ways of going on, and that understanding intentional actions presupposes
a shared form of life (Collins and Kusch 1998, pp. 14 and 55). As an un-
derstanding of pragmatics requires an understanding of intentions this
implies that the language of aliens will make no sense to us. In Frames of
Meaning, Collins and Pinch accept that “while the sociologist remains a
sociologist he is not a proper native member . . . and this may prevent him
from understanding native members” (Collins and Pinch 1982, p. 20).
Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin use Wittgensteinian terminology
throughout Leviathan and the Air-Pump, but are somewhat impatient with
philosophical discussion. Rather than wanting to discuss whether it is
possible to understand their subjects, they just want to get on with the
work of doing it (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, p. 15).3 Still, several state-
ments made in the book make it clear that Shapin and Schaffer accept that
there will be problems with understanding alien forms of life. They say,
“it is difªcult to see how one could understand a culture to which one was
a complete stranger,” and “We need to play the stranger, not to be the
stranger. A genuine stranger is simply ignorant”(Shapin and Scahffer
1985, pp. 4 and 6).
Other writers within the SSK movement have been heavily inºuenced
by Wittgenstein, but do not explicitly state that problems with under-
standing different forms of life should be expected. Barry Barnes has
Perspectives on Science 31
3. Shapin and Schaffer (1985) p. 15. A similarly pragmatic approach is taken by Collins
and Pinch in Frames of Meaning (1982). They say, “How can investigators, let alone read-
ers, understand a self-contained system that is not their own? The answer would seem to be
a negative one, but the authors have taken their cue from scientist respondents and got on
with the research in a pragmatic frame of mind. As will be seen our claim is that we did
achieve this understanding. The reader must ªnd the proof of the pudding, or otherwise, in
the eating” (p. 10).
written a book on Kuhn. He takes “paradigms” and “forms of life” to be
equivalent, and states that different forms of scientiªc life are incommen-
surable—which strongly suggests that he thinks that different forms of
life cannot understand one another (Barnes 1982). David Bloor has writ-
ten two books on Wittgenstein, but avoids discussing whether problems
with understanding can be expected between forms of life (Bloor 1983
and 1997).
As some sociologists of scientiªc knowledge use Wittgenstein without
mentioning problems regarding understanding alien forms of life some
readers may wonder whether this paper discusses a problem that exists
only in my mind. Maybe when authors talk of “forms of life” this need not
be taken to carry the implication that different forms of life will have
problems understanding one another? Maybe those authors who do talk of
there being problems with understanding have simply made a minor er-
ror, and these claims could be deleted from their work without loss.
Couldn’t the term “form of life” be used to mean simply something like
“style of reasoning”? I suggest that this interpretation is not an option, for
two reasons. First, many sociologists of scientiªc knowledge are philo-
sophically sophisticated. They know very well that the term “form of life”
is philosophically loaded and that alien forms of life have often been
thought incomprehensible. If they wished to use “form of life” without it
having this implication surely they would make this clear. Second, studies
that have claimed to study other forms of life have drawn conclusions that
can only be justiªed if “form of life” is used in its full-blooded Witt-
gensteinian sense. Shapin and Schaffer conclude Leviathan and the Air-
Pump by stating “As we come to recognize the conventional and artifactual
status of our forms of knowing, we put ourselves in a position to realize
that it is ourselves and not reality that is responsible for what we know”
(1985 p. 344). Similarly, Collins and Pinch end Frames of Meaning by say-
ing “It would seem that evidence is so bound up with the society or social
group which gives rise to it that theories held by members of radically dif-
ferent scientiªc-social groups cannot be adequately tested against each
other by experiment. . . . What has been demonstrated, with speciªc refer-
ence to science, is that the idea of paradigm incommensurability, even
when interpreted in its most radical Winchian/Wittgensteinian sense, has
a part to play in the understanding of contemporary science” (1982,
pp. 184–5). When these sociologists of scientiªc knowledge claim to
study alien forms of life, they are talking of “forms of life” in a full-
blooded sense, and need to use it in this sense in order to get the conclu-
sions they draw. As such, they invite the question of whether it is possible
to understand aliens.
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Characteristically, proponents of SSK give “form of life” a more social
reading than would some other Wittgensteinians. They are happy to talk,
for example, of Boyle and Hobbes, or of scientists working in Italy and in
the U.S., as belonging to different forms of life (Shapin and Schaffer 1985;
Collins 1998). As an aside, I shall merely note that whether “form of life”
as used by Wittgenstein should be interpreted in such a way is controver-
sial. Some Wittgensteinians would interpret “form of life” in biological
rather than in cultural terms, in which case there would be only one
human form of life, one Martian form of life, one dog form of life, and so
on.4 Here, however, for the sake of argument, I shall simply assume that
the SSK use of “form of life” is admissible.
Exactly what should count as “gaining understanding of another form
of life” is a question that hovers over the entire debate. I suggest that de-
grees of understanding vary along a continuum. At a very minimal level,
some understanding is required for us even to be justiªed in claiming that
the other beings possess a language, as opposed to merely making mean-
ingless sounds. Moving up the scale, we might have understanding
sufªcient to enable us to make some claims concerning how the other be-
ings see the world, for example we might be able to make statements like
“During the Renaissance, people saw the world in terms of analogies.”
Finally, we might acquire mastery of another form of life, in which case we
would be able to pass as native speakers.
The extent to which sociologists of scientiªc knowledge need their
readers to gain understanding of an alien form of life depends on the
details of their project. In some cases it might be enough for readers to
simply come to know that other reasonable people have thought about
evidence, experiment, or whatever it might be, differently. At least in
some cases, however, sociologists of scientiªc knowledge have engaged in
projects that require readers to gain a far higher degree of understanding.
Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump opens with a quote from
Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose. According to the quote, God under-
stands the world because “He conceived it in His mind, as if from the out-
side.” Shapin and Schaffer likewise wish to shed light on the experimental
form of life by presenting a view of it from the outside. They seek to do
this via coming to share the point of view of Hobbes, who in their view
was an outsider to the experimental form of life. They say, “We shall be
adopting something close to a ‘members account’ of Hobbes’s anti-
experimentalism. That is to say, we want to put ourselves in a position
where objections to the experimental programme seem plausible, sensible
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and rational” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, p. 13.). For such a project, know-
ing that Hobbes was a clever man, and that he probably had his reasons for
thinking what he did, will not do. Rather the aim is to at least begin to
think like Hobbes.
Shapin and Schaffer’s ultimate aim in adopting Hobbes’ ways of think-
ing is to make our own practices seem strange. They seek to temporarily
alienate us from our own form of life. With this goal in mind, it might be
thought that whether they succeed in accurately depicting the actual alien
form of life inhabited by Hobbes, or just manage to sketch a possible alter-
native form of life, doesn’t much matter. For their project they only need
to show us that our ways of thinking are not the only possible ones. This
line of thought might be taken to suggest that my worry about whether
we can gain understanding of aliens is misplaced. So long as Leviathan and
the Air-Pump succeeds in problematizing the practices of experimentation,
through showing that it would be possible to think otherwise, who cares
whether the portrayal of Hobbes is accurate or not?
I suggest that this line of thought is mistaken. If Leviathan and the
Air-Pump succeeds in showing that an anti-experimental form of life is
genuinely possible, it does so through showing that an actual person,
Hobbes, was a member of such a form of life. It is because Shapin and
Schaffer claim to have evidence that a sane and clever man managed to live
a consistent anti-experimentalism, that they can claim that such an ap-
proach is a coherent possibility. That SSK descriptions of other forms of
life need to be accurate to achieve their authors’ aims is brought out more
clearly in the work of Harry Collins. Collins sees his case studies as con-
tributing to an “empirical relativist programme” (Collins 1983).5 His case
studies are supposed to provide empirical evidence that supports relativist
claims. The case studies can only do this if they are accurate. Collins’ con-
cern that other researchers should be able to replicate his ªndings further
illustrates that he intends his descriptions of alien forms of life to accu-
rately convey actual ways of thinking (Collins [1983], pp. 92–93; [1984],
p. 65.)
In the remainder of the paper I examine the techniques that are candi-
date methods for enabling us to understand alien forms of life. First, I ask
how sociologists might gain understanding of alien forms of life them-
selves. Second, I ask how this knowledge can be passed on to readers. The
issues involved in asking whether we can understand beings belonging to
different forms of life are closely tied to those involved in asking whether
understanding is possible across Quine’s conceptual schemes or Kuhn’s
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5. The idea that SSK case studies provide empirical support for relativism also comes
over clearly in Barnes and Bloor (1982) p. 24.
paradigms.6 Because these issues are so closely linked, and the literature
speciªcally on understanding different forms of life is sparse, I shall make
use of arguments that were originally intended as contributions to these
other radical interpretation debates within this discussion.
The discussion here, concerned with the claims of Wittgensteinian
Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge to understand alien forms of life, also
has links with debates in anthropology concerning problems with under-
standing radically different cultures, and debates in historiography con-
cerning problems with understanding people from different historical pe-
riods. Although much of the discussion here will be relevant to these other
debates, I concentrate speciªcally on the problems faced by Wittgen-
steinian Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge. This is because problems
with understanding the other take on different forms depending on the
theoretical commitments of the theorists involved. I concentrate on the
problems faced by Wittgensteinian Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge
because the problems faced by this group are of direct interest to science
studies. In addition, members of this group explicitly share a set of theo-
retical commitments, in a way that, say, anthropologists, do not, making
the difªculties faced by Wittgensteinian Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowl-
edge more accessible to philosophical analysis.
How to understand aliens
Candidate method 1. Translation
Many of the sociologists of scientiªc knowledge hold that translation
between forms of life is impossible.7 I agree with them. However, transla-
tion remains the most obvious way in which we might attempt to gain
understanding of another form of life, and so the reasons why it will not
work are worth reviewing.
In “The very idea of a conceptual scheme,” Davidson famously argued
that the project of trying to translate from another conceptual scheme into
our own is incoherent. Davidson goes on to claim, as a result, that individ-
uation criteria for conceptual schemes are lacking, and thus that talk of
“conceptual schemes” is nonsensical. Although Davidson is concerned
with Quinian conceptual schemes rather than with Wittgensteinian forms
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of life, his argument that translation between conceptual schemes is im-
possible can also be used to argue against the possibility of being able to
translate from one form of life to another.
Davidson claims that whenever we are faced with a being making a
nonsensical sentence we have a choice. We can either translate the sen-
tence in such a way that the being appears to share our concepts but has
false beliefs, or we can translate the sentence in such a way that the being
appears to have true beliefs but different concepts. There is nothing to
choose between the two options. If we translate the sentence in such a way
that the being has different concepts then they will count as a member of
another form of life. But, as we could just have easily have taken the alter-
native translation, it makes no sense to claim that the being actually either
is or is not a member of a different form of life. To use Davidson’s example,
suppose a person says, “Look at that handsome yawl!” as a ketch is sailing
by. When attempting to make sense of this statement we can either sup-
pose that the person is using the word “yawl” to express a different con-
cept from ourselves, and thus maybe sees the world differently from the
way we see it, or we can suppose that the person simply has a false belief
about the sailing boat—they mistakenly think it is a yawl. No evidence
can enable us to decide which of these options we should take. To take an-
other example, this time from the history of science, one seventeenth cen-
tury “refutation” of Galileo’s discovery of the moons of Jupiter argued that
as there are seven “windows” of the head there must also be seven planets.8
Either we can conclude that people in the seventeenth century thought in
a radically different way to ourselves, or we can make sense of the argu-
ment by positing that they had the false belief that God created harmony
between man and the heavens.
H. J. Glock has suggested that Davidson’s claim, that the alien speech
cannot be translated, might be resisted by thinking of translation as being
achieved on the basis of similar patterns of behavior, rather than as de-
pending on shared beliefs (Glock 1998). The thought seems to be that an
alien word should be translated as, say, “salt,” not because the aliens share
our beliefs that the stuff is sodium chloride, that there is lots of it in the
sea and so on, but because everyone scatters it over their ªsh and chips.
This idea is incoherent. Another’s beliefs and another’s behavior should
not be considered as independent criteria for establishing a translation. As
we are not telepathic, we only have access to other’s beliefs via their behav-
ior, and we attribute to others those beliefs required to rationalize their
behavior. Thus if a being presents us with behavior that is similar to our
own (which might well include verbal behavior such as saying “I believe
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8. Attributed to Francesco Sizi, cited in G. Holton and D. Roller (1958) p. 160.
salt is sodium chloride”) we conclude that the being possesses the same
beliefs as us. Appeals to behavior do not offer a way out, and we can con-
clude that we will be unable to directly translate between forms of life.
I accept Davidson’s argument that it is not possible to translate be-
tween conceptual schemes, or forms of life. However, I do not accept that
this demonstrates that talk of conceptual schemes or forms of life is inco-
herent. Davidson’s argument depends on the assumption that the only
way we could gain understanding of aliens is via translation. Having dis-
missed the possibility of translation, Davidson concludes that we could
not gain understanding of an alien conceptual scheme, and thus that talk
of conceptual schemes is nonsensical. I think that it is possible to gain
understanding of aliens, though not via translation, and thus resist
Davidson’s conclusion that talk of conceptual schemes, or forms of life, is
incoherent.
It is worth noting that even if translation could be achieved, there is
reason to doubt that this would necessarily be sufªcient for understand-
ing. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein brieºy raises the possi-
bility that we could come across a strange people who use the same words
as us, but still not be able to understand them. It might be that although
their words made sense to us, their sentences did not. We would not be
able to “ªnd our feet” with such a people (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 223). In-
deed such cases seem fairly commonplace. Consider, the following exam-
ple given by Martin Hollis (1996, p. 199). Hollis reports that some
Yoruba people carefully carry boxes covered with cowrie shells wherever
they go. When asked about the boxes they reply that they are their heads
or souls and must be protected from witchcraft. In this case the words
make sense, but I suggest that the statement is incomprehensible to us.
We cannot make sense of what it would be like to live as someone who be-
lieved that a box was his or her soul. I conclude that translation between
forms of life cannot be achieved, and in any case might well not be
sufªcient for understanding.
Candidate method 2. Overlapping Forms of Life
Two forms of life overlap, but are non-identical, when their members see
the same similarity relations and “go on” in the same ways in some, but
not all, domains. Sometimes it is suggested that when forms of life overlap
a sociologist can make use of the shared portion in order to explain the un-
shared portion.9 While he was not explicitly talking about forms of life,
something like this idea has been articulated in greatest detail by Martin
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Hollis. In a series of papers Hollis has claimed that alien cultures can
always be interpreted, as any two cultures will necessarily share a “bridge-
head” of universally shared beliefs ([1967a,b] 1970, 1982). According to
Hollis the bridgehead consists of “what a rational man cannot fail to be-
lieve in simple perceptual situations, organized by rules of coherent judge-
ment, which a rational man cannot fail to subscribe to” (1982, p. 74). The
investigator is supposed to build on these shared basic beliefs and prac-
tices to gain understanding of beliefs and practices that are not shared.
Hollis’ claim that there is a core set of beliefs and practices shared by all
cultures is dubious. As Barnes and Bloor point out, the doctrine of the
bridgehead seems to be a version of the idea that there is a pure observa-
tion language (referring to “what a man cannot fail to perceive in simple
perceptual situations”), that can be contrasted with language that is more
theoretical and problematic (1982, pp. 39–40). The notion that a distinc-
tion can be drawn between an observational and a theoretical language has
been widely rejected (see, for example, Churchland [1988], Kuhn [1962],
Popper [1959]). Barnes and Bloor nicely bring out some of the difªculties
through showing how even a paradigmatically empirical term such as
“bird” can be problematic. They report that the Karam of New Guinea
have a term “yakt” that refers to most birds, and also bats, but excludes
cassowaries. The resulting class seems natural to the Karam, who see all
“yakt” as being alike. We, however, do not see the similarity relations that
they do, and so ªnd the class unnatural. An anthropologist who took it
that the Karam must see similarities where we do would be led badly
astray.
Following Barnes and Bloor, I suggest that Hollis is wrong to claim
that aliens will necessarily see things roughly as we do. The existence of a
universally shared “bridgehead” can be doubted. In addition, and more
importantly, even in cases where there is some “bridgehead,” and forms of
life do have some overlap, this overlap cannot be used by an investigator to
gain understanding of the alien portion of a form of life. Members of a
form of life see the same similarity relations and ªnd it natural to “go on”
in the same ways. However, they cannot explain to a partial outsider why
it is that certain things seem obvious and natural to them. This is because
they have no explanation for why it is that they “go on” in the way that
they do—the way that they do things simply strikes them as the only pos-
sible way of doing things. Consider Wittgenstein’s example of the odd ad-
der (Wittgenstein [1958], §185). The odd adder is assumed to speak Eng-
lish. To some extent he is like us. Still, it is impossible for us to explain to
the odd adder why we produce the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . . from the
rule “add two.” We ªnd it natural to apply the rule in this way, the odd
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adder ªnds it natural to do otherwise, and that it all there is to be said. As
members of a form of life cannot explain the practices that make up their
form of life to themselves, they haven’t got a hope of being able to explain
them to a member of an overlapping form of life.
A real life example from Oliver Sacks The Anthropologist from Mars fur-
ther illustrates the limits of our explanatory powers. Sacks describes a
highly intelligent autistic person who is perfectly capable of understand-
ing advanced scientiªc literature (Sacks [1995], “An Anthropologist on
Mars”). Nevertheless, despite repeated attempts at explanation, they can-
not grasp the concept of having a friend. Similarly, it is not possible to ex-
plain to a profoundly deaf person what it is like to hear. Even when beings
belong to overlapping forms of life, they cannot use what they have in
common to explain their differences.
Candidate method 3. Anthropological methods
Many authors have suggested that “anthropological” methods can be used
to gain understanding of alien forms of life (for example, Collins
[1998]; Barnes and Bloor [1982], p. 37; Feyerabend [1987], p. 76; Kuhn
[1982], p. 673). The idea seems to be that by immersing oneself in an-
other culture, perhaps for several years, one can learn to perceive the world
as members of another form of life perceive it.
The anthropological method is different from the overlapping forms of
life method discussed in the last section. In the overlapping forms of life
method, the sociologists go up to an alien, whose form of life overlaps
with their own to some extent, and ask the alien to explain those practices
that seem odd. As discussed, this method fails because there are no such
explanations. In contrast, someone using the anthropological method does
not seek understanding primarily through explanation. Rather, they seek
to learn the alien form of life as does an alien infant—through “immer-
sion” in the culture, or “socialization.”10 While it’s unclear exactly how in-
fants learn to behave appropriately, it is certainly the case that at least to
begin with they do not rely on language. To some extent, infants, and an-
thropologists, are trained using the same methods that are used to train
animals (although this will not be the whole story). Their behavior is
modiªed by the use of rewards and punishments, and adult aliens use a va-
riety of strategies to manipulate them into behaving well (for example,
they can make sure they are hungry at appropriate times by regulating
their access to food). Anthropologists will learn a form of life to a large
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extent through conditioning, and also through trial and error. To put
things crudely, rather than having things explained to them, they will
learn at least the basics through being bashed into shape.
The ªrst thing to be said about the anthropological method is that even
if it would work the anthropological approach would be limited in its ap-
plication. Learning a new form of life through enculturation would re-
quire that the anthropologists enter into social interactions with their
subjects. This leaves much of the historical side of SSK in difªculties, to
put it mildly.11 It is clearly impossible to interact socially with dead sub-
jects. Historians might attempt to become enculturated by, for example,
visiting places where their subjects lived, using the instruments they
used, and trying to live as they did. However, the information that can be
gleaned through such practices will still radically underdetermine the
form of life of the subjects. Historians should not be fooled into thinking
that they can make plausible attempts to ªll in the gaps in their knowl-
edge via trying to empathize with the people they are studying. Different
forms of life differ as to what seems natural. Thus we have every reason to
think that historians’ judgements of “what must have been the case” will
not correspond to how their subjects would have seen things.
The claim that historians cannot gain understanding of dead people
who thought very differently is not novel, but has a respectable pedigree.
R. G. Collingwood held that for historians to gain understanding of their
subjects it is necessary for them to re-enact their subjects’ thoughts. This
would not always be possible. For re-enactment, “The object must be of
such a kind that it can revive itself in the historian’s mind; the historian’s
mind must be such as to offer a home for that revival” (Collingwood 1961,
p. 304). In cases where historians are very different from their subjects,
their minds might be incapable of rethinking their subjects’ thoughts,
and they will not be able to understand them.
Historians cannot use the “anthropological method,” but might sociol-
ogists have more luck? Might it be possible for sociologists to become a
member of two or more forms of life by immersing themselves in different
cultures? Robert Kirk has argued that it is impossible that someone could
gain simultaneous mastery of two forms of life. Suppose someone had mas-
tery of two forms of life then, he writes, “ . . . someone whose natural pre-
dispositions and tendencies allowed them to speak one of the languages in
a way acceptable to native speakers could also possess natural predisposi-
tions and tendencies which enabled them to speak the other equally ac-
ceptably. But this would be possible only if the same set of natural dispo-
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sitions enabled someone to speak both. And that is impossible. For the
point about forms of life is that given our predispositions, we agree on
what is acceptable, while anyone with a different set of predispositions
would not agree with us. Having both sets would involve having incom-
patible predispositions” (1986, p. 214).
Unlike the writers I have discussed so far, Kirk considers forms of life
to be largely biologically grounded (Kirk [1986], p. 23). When he talks of
“predispositions” he thinks of these as being biologically ªxed. The reason
why it is impossible to possess two sets of such predispositions at once is
that our brains must either be “set” in one way or another.
While, as mentioned earlier, the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s
“forms of life” is controversial, Kirk must be right in thinking that at least
one sense in which it is intended is biological. “If a lion could talk, we
could not understand him” (Wittgenstein [1958], p. 223), and this, it is
implied, is because the lion belongs to a biologically different form of life
than ourselves. Furthermore, Kirk must also be right in thinking that
some ways of life are inaccessible to us for biological reasons. Our sense or-
gans and brains are such that what it is like to be a bat, for example, will
famously always be hidden from us.
Even if we restrict ourselves to the sense of “form of life” used in the
rest of this paper, and think of people from different cultures as belonging
to different forms of life, there may be cases where it is impossible to learn
a form of life because our brains lack the requisite ºexibility. Proponents
of the method of enculturation are fond of pointing out that babies learn
the form of life into which they are born with few problems (see for exam-
ple, Barnes and Bloor [1982], p. 37; Collins [1985], p. 25, note 14;
Feyerabend [1987], p. 76). The moral they wish us to draw is that total
immersion in a culture will enable them to learn ways of going on with
comparable ease. While the successes of anthropological ªeldwork demon-
strates that it is often possible for an investigator to come to think in new
ways, it may not be the case that an adult investigator can learn anything
that a native infant can. There may be a crucial period of time in which an
infant is biologically primed to learn “ways of going on.” Eric Lenneberg,
and other adherents of the Critical Period Hypothesis, claim that humans
are biologically predisposed to learn languages with ease only during a
period lasting from the age of about two to the early teens (Lenneberg
1967). Learning a form of life might well be similar. If this were the case,
anyone who seeks to learn a form of life outside of this critical period may
encounter great difªculties. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that this
may well be the case. The children of immigrants are often able to “go
native” while their parents are not. Both may be totally immersed in an
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alien culture, but younger brains can absorb it in a way that older brains
cannot.
Here I have stressed that there may well be biological limits to the
forms of life that we can learn because I think this is a point that has often
been ignored by those who would learn to think like aliens. The assump-
tion that a middle-aged academic can easily learn anything that an infant
can learn is optimistic, to say the least. This being said, in the sense in
which the Sociologists of Scientiªc Knowledge use “form of life,” there
will surely be cases where differences between forms of life are founded on
differences in mental software as opposed to differences in brain hard-
wear. The differences between Italian and American physicists, for exam-
ple, are unlikely to lead to unalterable biological differences in their
brains. When differences between forms of life are not biologically ªxed,
it may be possible for a person to possess two separate sets of dispositions,
and thus to belong to two forms of life at once. A range of commonplace
phenomenon suggests that this can happen. Different sets of dispositions
may be activated depending on the social context. Many people, for exam-
ple, ªnd that different accents and different vocabularies come naturally to
them in different social settings. Thus a person can ªnd it natural to speak
perfect B.B.C. English when giving a presentation, but revert to some-
thing quite different in the pub. Similarly we could imagine someone who
found it natural to think in accord with different forms of life depending
on the environment. And indeed, this is how those who claim to be famil-
iar with two forms of life suggest it works. In their study of parapsychol-
ogy, Collins and Pinch found that their beliefs “tended to change as a
function of the nature of the latest period of prolonged exposure to scien-
tists,” that is when with parapsychologists they found it natural to think
like parapsychologists, and when with doubters they found it natural to
think like doubters (Collins and Pinch [1979], p. 715; Collins and Pinch
[1982], p. 23).
Thus, while in certain cases our biology may render us incapable of
assimilating a form of life, plausibly there will be other cases where this is
not a problem, and I am happy to accept the possibility that one might
come to be a member of two distinct forms of life through enculturation
(at least in the sense of “form of life” whereby people from different cul-
tures belong to different forms of life). Let’s suppose, then, that our an-
thropologists succeed in understanding the native form of life. Still, their
task is not complete. In order for the anthropologists to be academics
rather than people who have just “gone native,” when they eventually re-
turn to their home culture they must be able to pass on some of the under-
standing they have gained. This leads us to our second question, once the
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anthropologists have come to understand the aliens, can they pass on what
they have learnt to their readers?
How to pass on understanding of aliens
I have come across three suggestions as to how anthropologists might be
able to pass on what they learn to their audience. Two are unsatisfactory;
the third can be developed into an account of a method that might work.
Candidate method 1. Translation
As already discussed, straight translation between two forms of life is im-
possible. Still, the thought might linger that a bilingual would be able to
achieve a translation where others could not. This is a mistake. The fact
that in the person of the anthropologist one individual has mastery of two
forms of life is not going to help matters. Quine best puts the point. He
asks us to imagine a bilingual engaged in the construction of a translation
manual from Jungle to English. The bilingual will have to set about his
task “much as if his English personality were the linguist and his jungle
personality the informant; the differences are just that he can introspect
his experiments instead of staging them” (Quine 1960, p. 71). Thus the
anthropologist who attempts to translate from one language to the other
will succumb to the problems discussed in the last section.
Candidate method 2. Evolving and merging forms of life
Another suggestion is for the returning anthropologists to try to make use
of the possibility that forms of life can evolve and merge into one an-
other.12 Perhaps the returning anthropologists could so act on their native
form of life that it evolved to the extent that it merged with the alien form
of life, enabling the anthropologists’ knowledge to be understood. There
are two problems with this idea. The ªrst problem is that changing a form
of life is not easy. Even on the liberal reading of “form of life” favored by
the proponents of SSK, a form of life is constituted by deep seated habits
of reasoning, customs, ways of seeing the world, and so on. Although it is
not clear exactly what it would take to change these, it is likely that it
would be a difªcult and time-consuming business. If the anthropologists
just write a handful of papers and give a few seminars this probably will
not be enough to do the trick. The second problem is that even if the an-
Perspectives on Science 43
12. Suggested in the context of Kuhnian paradigms by Kindi (1995). Winch ([1964]
1970) suggests that “seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend
the boundaries of our own—not simply to bring the other way within the already existing
boundaries of our own, because the point about the latter in their present form, is that they
ex hypothesi exclude the other”(p. 99).
thropologists are inºuential enough to change the form of life, the way in
which it will change will not be under their control. Wittgensteinian rela-
tivists claim that what seems rational, and what is true, depends on our
form of life. However, although truth is in some sense a human construc-
tion, they constantly stress that this does not mean that we can change the
truth to ªt our desires. Thus the anthropologists cannot set out to alter
their form of life in such a way that it merges with an alien form of life.
Candidate method 3. Employing the “Techniques of the novelist”
Harry Collins suggests that anthropologists can relay knowledge of the
other form of life using the “techniques of a novelist” (Collins [1984];
Feyerabend [1987] makes a similar suggestion). However, this is a sugges-
tion he does not expand on in any detail. Discussing how, and what, we
can learn from novels is a slippery business, and so developing Collins’
suggestion, and then assessing it, will take some time. The effort, how-
ever, will be worthwhile. I shall argue that Collins’ suggestion can be de-
veloped into a method that might, in some cases, enable readers to gain
understanding of an alien form of life. Although Collins suggests that us-
ing the techniques of the novelist may help, the development of this idea
given here is my own. Whether Collins would approve of it or not, I’m
not sure.
The idea that using the “techniques of the novelist” might help is best
approached via a consideration of tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge, we
all know, cannot be learnt via reading normal instructions. Still tacit
knowledge can be learnt, and the process via which it is learnt cannot be
purely mysterious. Maybe scientists can’t get the equipment to work
merely by reading the instructions manual, but if they spend long enough
working with people who already have the necessary expertise they should
eventually pick up the required skills.
This transfer of knowledge does not involve telepathy. Novices who
eventually gain expertise must be picking up observable information from
the environment. Admittedly, this will not be limited simply to what
they are told. Body language may be important. Having the opportunity
to observe exactly what the other scientists are doing, and to copy them,
and be corrected by them, may be necessary. Still, when novices develop
into experts the information they are picking up on must be made mani-
fest in some way. Something about what they can see, or hear, or feel, gives
them the information that they need.
In some cases it is possible to recreate those aspects of the environment
that learners pick up on, and thus to train novices in artiªcial environ-
ments. For example, ºying a plane must be an activity that requires tacit
knowledge, if any does, and novice pilots are trained in part on ºight sim-
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ulators. Flight simulators do not simulate aeroplanes in all respects, but
are similar enough in relevant respects to enable pilots to learn to ºy. In
such cases, tacit knowledge can be learnt in a virtual environment.
Jane Heal suggests that Wittgenstein should be interpreted as claiming
that understanding can best be thought of as an ability (Heal 1998). Such
a model implies that learning to understand beings belonging to an alien
form of life and learning tacit knowledge will be similar enterprises. As
such, if tacit knowledge can sometimes be learnt through interacting with
virtual environments, it may be possible to learn a form of life in a similar
way. This, I take it, is where the notion of using the “techniques of the
novelist” comes in. In a sense, a good novel transports the reader into a
virtual world.13 A well-described scene becomes vivid in our mind’s eye,
and we react to the characters of the ªction in many respects as we do to
real people. Although Collins does not ºesh out his suggestion in any de-
tail, I take it that the anthropologists aim would be to use the techniques
of the novelist to transport their readers into an imaginary environment
that models the environment in which the anthropologists have done their
ªeldwork. The anthropologists gained understanding of an alien form of
life via immersion in a real alien environment. The hope is that the reader
will be able to gain some understanding of that form of life through im-
mersion in an imaginary alien environment. It will be useful to have a
term for the texts that might facilitate such an immersion. I will call them
anthro-novels.
What are the techniques that the writers of anthro-novels might use in
order to help their readers vividly imagine aliens? In Leviathan and the
Air-Pump, Shapin and Schaffer claim that Robert Boyle used literary tech-
niques in order to enable the readers of his experimental reports to virtu-
ally witness the experiment by reproducing it in their imagination (as
air-pumps were rare and expensive, a virtual air-pump was the best that
most of his readers could hope for). The task faced by the writer of an
anthro-novel is somewhat similar to that faced by Boyle, and the same
kinds of methods might be used. Boyle provided his readers with pictures
of his air-pumps. “By virtue of the density of circumstantial detail that
could be conveyed through the engraver’s laying of lines, they imitated re-
ality and gave the viewer a vivid impression of the experimental scene”
(Shapin and Schaffer 1985, p. 62). Boyle also described his experiments at
length and gave many circumstantial details. Shapin and Schaffer report
that even Boyle’s sentence structure “with appositive clauses piled on top
of each other, was . . . part of a plan to convey circumstantial details and to
give the impression of verisimilitude” (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, p. 63).
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13. I am grateful to Ken Smith for suggesting this idea to me.
Writers of anthro-novels might learn from Boyle and seek to make their
descriptions vivid through providing pictures and details. Other tech-
niques might also be employed. Collins has tried including quotes from
interviews in his work, in an attempt to mimic the effect of dialogue in
novels.14
Unfortunately, however, there are reasons for thinking that simply de-
scribing the alien environment, however vividly, will not be enough. The
anthropologists did not learn the alien form of life simply through obser-
vation, but via interaction. They made mistakes, and were corrected, and
gradually came to be able to do the right thing. If the reader’s immersion
in an imaginary environment is to function like the anthropologists’ im-
mersion in a real environment, then the process the reader goes through
will probably need to be something like the process the anthropologists
went through. And here a problem emerges: It is impossible for a reader
to interact with imaginary alien characters. Their lines have already been
written, and so they can’t respond to the reader’s questions or comments.
Admittedly, when reading normal novels a reader might gain some under-
standing of characters by engaging in imaginary dialogue with them. In
the case of alien characters, however, such methods will not work. If a
reader tries to imagine how an alien character would respond to a ques-
tion, the answer they generate will almost certainly be way off the mark.
The character, after all, is alien, and so they will not respond as the reader
would think natural.
The only way around such problems that I can think of is for there to
be a character in the anthro-novel with whom the reader can empathize. A
character belonging to the same form of life as the reader, who will ask the
alien characters the questions the reader would ask, and will respond to
their oddities as the reader would. The easiest way of achieving this would
be if the anthropologist featured as a character. The anthro-novel would
recount the anthropologist’s interactions with the aliens. Through empa-
thizing with the anthropologist, the reader would become immersed
virtually in the alien-culture, and this immersion would enable the reader
to learn to understand the alien culture, in the same kind of way as the
anthropologist’s actual immersion enabled the development of under-
standing. Or, that at least would be the hope.
In some cases anthro-novels would not work. I suspect that a form of
life may be under-pinned by physical factors that cannot be reproduced via
reading a novel. Aliens may think in the way they do because they are
drunk, or high, or hungry, and in such cases I doubt that it will be possi-
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14. See Collins and Pinch (1982) for examples. In personal correspondence Collins has
told me that the point of these interview quotes is to mimic a novel.
ble for the reader of a novel to come to reproduce their ways of thinking
unless they happen to have been in the same kind of state. Some are more
optimistic about the abilities of novelists than I am, and think it relatively
unproblematic for a novel to convey what it is like to be insane, or on
drugs, for example. I accept that I may have been overly impressed by the
claim traditionally made by philosophers of mind that what it is like to
experience particular “qualia” or “raw feels” cannot be conveyed in words
(see, for example, Jackson [1986], Nagel [1974]). Although such claims
are often made, it is true that they tend to be accepted as intuitively obvi-
ous, rather than argued for. I have no way of convincing those who
do not share such intuitions that they are correct. I can only say that
other philosophers than myself have found it intuitively plausible that
words cannot convey what it is like to experience qualia (although if
pushed I would be forced to accept that this may just indicate that we lack
imagination).
Even where such potential problems are not a worry, an anthro-novel
would demand a lot from the reader. The reader must become immersed
in an imaginary environment in a way that mimics the anthropologist’s
immersion in a real environment. Immersion in a culture takes time and
active participation. As such, anthro-novels would probably have to be
quite long, and the reader would have to actively empathize with the char-
acter of the anthropologist. Readers who skimmed pages would be un-
likely to achieve the necessary level of involvement.
Writers of anthro-novels will also have a tough job. Writing novels is
not easy, and sociologists of scientiªc knowledge who wished to use such a
method would have to learn new skills. Interestingly, however, the writers
of anthro-novels will not have to worry about one traditional constraint on
case studies in the social sciences. The account of interactions with the
aliens does not have to be literally true. The point of the anthro-novel is
not to tell readers what happened, but to enable them to come to under-
stand alien ways of thinking. As such, dialogue does not have to record
word for word what the aliens actually said; reproducing the kinds of
things they would say if asked particular questions will do. Indeed, in
some cases the writers of anthro-novels might best help their readers to
virtually experience what they experienced in real life by not telling the
literal truth. Plausibly, seeing things in the mind’s eye has a different ef-
fect than really seeing them. In many cases actually seeing something is
more vivid than just imagining it. In such cases a scene in an anthro-novel
might have to describe things in unrealistically extreme terms in order for
the effect on the reader to be analogous to the effect of the real scene on
the anthropologists. In other cases, the effect of reading about something
might be more vivid than experiencing it in real life. Reading about
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something takes a minimum amount of time, while in reality even ex-
treme thoughts or feelings can be ºeeting and so have little effect. In such
cases, authors might have to tone down a report of what they actually
experienced if the effect on the reader is to be similar.
So far as I know, no Sociologist of Scientiªc Knowledge has written
anything resembling an anthro-novel. However, books very like the
anthro-novels I have described exist in other ªelds. An example is Elenore
Smith Bowen’s Return to Laughter, which is a ªctionalized account of
Bowen’s experiences of ªeldwork with an African tribe. Bowen’s primary
aim is to convey what it is like to experience the tensions of ªeldwork. She
seeks to convey what it is like to be an anthropologist being changed
by immersion in an alien culture, and focuses in particular on the personal
and moral problems that are caused by living between two cultures. As
Bowen aims primarily to convey what it is like to be an anthropologist,
rather than to enable the reader to come to understand the African tribe
with whom she lived, Return to Laughter differs somewhat from my idea
of an anthro-novel. Bowen spends more time describing her own feelings,
and less time discussing the reactions and customs of the tribe than would
an anthro-novel that aimed to convey understanding of an alien culture.
Still, Return to Laughter gives quite a good indication of what an anthro-
novel would be like, in that it is a ªctionalized account that succeeds
in getting the reader to empathize with the character of the anthro-
pologist.
Where differences between forms of life are not physically grounded,
and an anthro-novel is well-written, and the reader actively empathizes
with the character of the anthropologist, an anthro-novel might enable
readers to gain some understanding of an alien form of life. Some will ªnd
the “might” in the last sentence pathetically non-committal, but it is, I
think, unavoidable. On the one hand there are good reasons to think that
tacit knowledge, and understanding of a form of life, cannot be passed on
via normal texts. On the other hand, the process via which such knowl-
edge is passed on cannot be magical. As such, it should be possible to
learn anything that can be learnt via immersion in a real environment
through immersion in an artiªcial environment—providing the necessary
features of the real environment have been replicated. Whether the imagi-
nary environment created by an anthro-novel would be a good enough
replication to enable the reader to gain understanding of an alien form of
life is, I think, an empirical question.
That a reader felt they had gained understanding of aliens would of
course not be sufªcient to demonstrate that the anthro-novel had actually
been successful—it’s a sad fact of life that we often think we have under-
stood things that we have not. This is why we usually require people to
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prove their understanding via some kind of performance. Students may
sincerely think they have understood formal logic, say, but their claims are
so unreliable that we commonly place no weight on them at all. Only a
student who can actually construct truth tables, and translate into propo-
sitional logic, is accredited with understanding.
Similarly the understanding of the reader of an anthro-novel must be
judged by what they can do. The ultimate proof that an anthro-novel can
convey understanding would be if someone who read the novel could ac-
quire skills that can normally only be learnt through enculturation. The
most straightforward case would be if someone who had read the book
could pass as native in the alien culture. Almost certainly, however, this is
an unrealistic goal. A reader who could pass this test would have come to
see the world at least largely as the aliens see it—a task that might have
taken the anthropologist several years. Still, a reader could convey that
they had grasped at least some of the alien “ways of going on” if they
could predict how an alien would react in some novel circumstances. If
one has understood the differences in the evidential cultures of Italian and
American physicists, for example, one should have some idea which group
will be most likely to consider a new experiment as providing evidence for
a particular hypothesis.
I have claimed that historians of science cannot learn an alien form of
life through enculturation because their subjects are dead. However, in
some cases the analysis of controversies in the history of science might en-
able historians to gain understanding of aliens in somewhat the same way
that I am suggesting anthro-novels might enable readers to gain under-
standing of aliens. Suppose one historical actor, Mr. Similar, is involved
in a debate with another historical actor, Ms. Different. Mr. Similar hap-
pens to think in a way rather like ourselves; Ms. Different is an alien.
Mr. Similar’s reports of his confrontations with Ms. Different might func-
tion for the historian like an anthro-novel written by an anthropologist.
Mr. Similar can interact with Ms. Different and so gain some understand-
ing of her ways of thinking. At the same time Mr. Similar is sufªciently
like us for us to be able to empathize with him. Through reading Mr. Sim-
ilar’s reports of his arguments with Ms. Different, and empathizing with
Mr. Similar, the historian might be able to virtually interact with Ms. Dif-
ferent and so come to gain some understanding of the alien form of life.
In general, however, there are reasons to be pessimistic about such an
approach. Coming to understand a form of life through immersion in a
real culture is quite difªcult. Coming to understand a form of life through
reading an anthro-novel would be harder. Coming to understand a form of
life through reading notes on a historical controversy would be harder yet.
This is because anthro-novels would be speciªcally written with the inten-
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tion of facilitating immersion in an imaginary world—they would be de-
signed to contain all the information the reader would need. In contrast,
historical records are likely to be patchy and were never written with the
intention of facilitating virtual interaction with aliens.
Conclusions
If the arguments of this paper are correct, then it contains both bad news
and good news for those who aim to understand aliens.
The good news
I have argued that there is a method that might enable sociologists of
scientiªc knowledge to gain understanding of an alien form of life and to
pass on this understanding to their readers. The sociologists would ªrst
have to gain understanding of the form of life themselves through encul-
turation. It should be noted that in some cases biological differences be-
tween members of different forms of life would make this impossible.
If the sociologists of science succeed in becoming enculturated then
their next challenge is to create an anthro-novel. The anthro-novel will re-
count their interactions with the aliens. If all goes well, through empa-
thizing with the anthropologists, the reader will become immersed virtu-
ally in the alien-culture, and this immersion will enable the reader to learn
to understand the alien culture, in the same kind of way as the anthropolo-
gists’ actual immersion enabled them to develop understanding.
While I hold that anthro-novels offer the best hope for the sociologist
of scientiªc knowledge who is trying to pass on understanding of an alien
form of life, I have not argued that they will deªnitely work. Whether the
virtual environment created by an anthro-novel would be good enough for
immersion in it to be relevantly equivalent to immersion in a real environ-
ment is, I think, an empirical question.
The bad news
The bad news is that so far as I know no Sociologist of Scientiªc Knowl-
edge has written an anthro-novel to date. As such those existing case stud-
ies that claim to enable readers to understand scientists belonging to dif-
ferent forms of life cannot be doing this. The techniques that their authors
use to try and enable the aliens to be understood are simply not up to the
job.
Of course this does not mean that I think that nothing can be gained
from current historical or sociological case studies. Although for ease of
discussion I have spoken about forms of life as if they were discrete, it is
probably better to think of forms of life as hierarchical and messy. Thus
two actors could share a form of life at one level, for example they could
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both be human, but belong to different forms of life at a ªner discrimina-
tion, for example one could be an Ancient Greek while the other comes
from twenty-ªrst century London. All the points made earlier still stand.
In the absence of enculturation (either obtained via ªeldwork or an
anthro-novel), I claim that one actor can understand the other only in so
far as they already share a form of life. Thus we can understand the An-
cient Greeks to a certain extent because we share a form of life at one level,
but in so far as we belong to a different form of life than the Ancient
Greeks there can be no understanding. This claim is consistent with my
earlier rejection of the Overlapping Forms of Life Method. The aim of the
Overlapping Forms of Life Method is to use the shared portions of a form
of life to explain the unshared portions. I claim this is impossible. Here, in
contrast, I am claiming merely that when our form of life overlaps with an
alien form there can be mutual understanding of the shared portion.
I conclude that SSK studies written to date that claim to convey under-
standing of alien forms of life cannot actually be doing this. Contrary to
the claims of the authors, to the extent that the scientists being studied
can be understood, they actually belong to the same form of life as the
reader. To make this claim plausible I will brieºy show how it can make
sense of one of the most famous case-studies that claims to describe an
alien form of life, Shapin and Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump.
Leviathan and the Air-Pump concerns a series of arguments between
Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle. Boyle believes in vacuums, and in the
use of fancy experimental apparatus, and trusts in expertise. Shapin and
Schaffer think he is rather like us. Hobbes is very different. He doesn’t be-
lieve in vacuums, he relies on philosophical argument rather than experi-
mentation, and he distrusts secret groups (including groups of scientists
who meet in private). According to Shapin and Schaffer we share a form of
life with Boyle, but not with Hobbes. If this is so, and if my claims in this
paper are correct, Hobbes should be incomprehensible to the reader, as Le-
viathan and the Air-Pump is no anthro-novel. Actually, however, Hobbes
comes across as being really rather reasonable. How can I cope with this?
Have I made a mistake? I claim that I have not, and that our ability to un-
derstand Hobbes can be explained in the following way: Shapin and
Schaffer are simply wrong to claim that Hobbes’ ways of thinking are ut-
terly alien. He shares a form of life with us to some extent, and to that ex-
tent he can be understood. For example, Hobbes claims that vacuums can-
not exist on a priori grounds. A vacuum would be an “immaterial
substance,” and “immaterial substance” is an oxymoron. Shapin and
Schaffer claim that using such a priori arguments against experimental re-
sults is foreign to us. In this, however, they are mistaken. Collins and
Pinch’s Frames of Meaning, for example, details a number of a priori argu-
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ments that are currently used by conventional scientists against experi-
mental results in parapsychology. While few would accept that Hobbes’
argument against vacuums is valid, the forms of reasoning that he em-
ploys are still in use today. To some extent at least he is no alien, and to
this extent he makes sense to us.
Incidentally, I suggest that Shapin and Schaffer are also wrong in sug-
gesting that Boyle totally shares our form of life. He may believe in vacu-
ums and be fond of experiments, but some of his ways of thinking are very
odd indeed. For example, Shapin and Schaffer report that Boyle held that
experimental philosophers should seek to produce arguments that will
convince men there is a God (1985, p. 319). The idea that it might be
possible to produce experimental proof of God’s existence is foreign to us,
I suggest. I conclude that we can understand both Hobbes and Boyle to an
extent, but only to an extent, because their forms of life partially overlap
with our own.
I claim that in so far as alien historical actors are alien they cannot
be understood because it is impossible to interact with them (apart from
the unusual case where remaining documents are sufªcient to serve as an
anthro-novel). Still, this should not be taken to mean that history is gen-
erally impossible. Historians can engage in activities that don’t require
them to understand historical actors (analyzing economic variables
and population trends, for example). More importantly, people from dif-
ferent times and cultures often have quite a lot in common with us, and
when forms of life overlap understanding is possible regarding the shared
portion.
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